

No. 12,986

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

ING Foo,

Appellant,

RD McGRATH, Attorney Gen-
the United States,

Appellee.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

CHAUNCEY TRAMUTOLO,

United States Attorney,

EDGAR R. BONSALE,

Assistant United States Attorney,

422 Post Office Building, San Francisco 1, California,

Attorneys for Appellee.

RGREAVES,

INE,

Section, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Building, San Francisco 1, California,

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**United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit**

WING FOO,

Appellant,

s.

HARD McGRATH, Attorney Gen-
of the United States,

Appellee.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Appellant filed an action, pursuant to Section
of the Nationality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1171; 8
903), in the Court below seeking a declara-
tion that he is a national and citizen of the
United States.

Appellant arrived at the Port of San Francisco, Cal-
ifornia on November 22, 1948 and applied for admis-
sion as the foreign born son of an American citizen.
He was detained by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service and accorded a hearing before a Board
of Special Inquiry convened pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

Wong Yem, and he was excluded as an alien without possession of a valid immigration visa. The decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was upheld by the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and subsequently affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The appellant then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Court below seeking a judgment declaring him to be a national and citizen of the United States.

In the course of the trial, the certified record of the proceedings before the Immigration and Naturalization Service was introduced into evidence over the objections of counsel for appellant. The lower court found for the defendant and from that judgment appellant now prosecutes this appeal.

ARGUMENT.

Appellant set forth the following points upon which he intends to rely:

1. The Court below erred in holding that appellant has failed to sustain the burden of establishing his relationship to his father, Wong Yem, by a preponderance of evidence.
2. The Court below erred in admitting into evidence, considering the records and transcripts of the immigration proceedings other than the transcripts of testimony of the plaintiff,

I.

ICIAL RECORDS AND TRANSCRIPT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO APPELLANT ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

Appellant in his brief first considered the section upon which he relies, that is "whether the original and transcript of the immigration proceedings are admissible in evidence."

Appellant emphasizes that 8 U.S.C. 903 (Sec. 503, Emergency Act of 1940) contemplates a trial *de novo*, and assumes that such a trial precludes the trial court from considering evidence presented at the administrative hearing.

Appellee agrees that 8 U.S.C. 903 contemplates a trial *de novo*, but disagrees as to the meaning and application of the term. It is believed that the Honorable Judge Murphy correctly held, that in an action such as this, the Court should not only consider evidence produced at the trial, but should also consider the record prepared during the administrative proceedings.

Appellant, pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. 903, seeks a writ of habeas corpus in equity to be tried without a jury, before the Honorable Judge of a United States District Court. In the course of proceedings the "Hearsay Rule" is rejected. (See 11 C.J.S. Para. 210, page 945.)

In the admission and review of evidence in an equity case, the Court possesses a broad discretion and is very liberal in the admission of evidence on

ment to the issues will be considered.
Para. 478, 47 Fed. (2d) 621, 640.)”

When the Board of Special Inquiry found appellant was not the blood son of Wong Yem, in substance that *appellant was attempting to illegally enter the United States.*

The Courts of the United States have recognized the ability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to ferret out fraudulent claims to United States citizenship. This view was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in *Tulsides v. Insular Co.* 262 U.S. 258, at 265, wherein the Court states as follows:

“* * * leave the administration of the law to the law the law intends it should be left; to the alertness of officers made alert to attempts at fraud, of it and instructed by experience of the law, the action which will be made to accomplish every

The present action is a suit in equity with the traditional requirement that he who seeks equitable relief must come into Court with clean hands. This principle was applied by the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Hyland v. Millers* 262 U.S. 258, 47 Fed. (2d) 1003, affirmed 91 Fed. (2d) 735, reversed 92 Fed. (2d) 462, certiorari denied 308 U.S. 645, stated:

“In a case involving fraud, the Court has the widest latitude in admitting evidence in every instance relative to the condition and relationship of the parties and subject matter and every

United States Supreme Court, in discussing an involving fraud, stated in the case of *Castle Bullard*, 64 U.S. 172, 187:

here fraud is of the essence of the charge. necessarily give rise to a wide range of investigation, for the reason that the intent of the defendant is, more or less, involved in the issue. Experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts is not generally to be expected, and for reason, among others, the law allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of ascertaining the truth. Great latitude, says Mr. Starkie, is justly allowed by the law to the reception of direct or circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, not merely for the purpose of remedying the want of direct evidence, but of supplying an invaluable protection against imposition." (1 *Stark, Ev.* p. 58.)

In many years this Honorable Court has recognized that false claims to U. S. citizenship have been made by persons seeking to illegally enter the States. In the case of *Siu Say v. Nagle*, 295 U.S. 130, when considering a Chinese relationship case, this Honorable Court stated:

"In cases of this character experience has demonstrated that testimony of the parties in interest as to the mere fact of relationship can not safely be accepted or relied upon."

The Honorable Court then quoted from the *Santobon v. Trinidad*, 7 Wheat. 283-337 (5 L. Ed. 454):

as in relation to the country of his birth, in a vessel on a particular voyage, or in a particular place, if the fact is otherwise it is extremely difficult to exonerate from the charge of deliberate falsehood the courts of justice, under such circumstances, bound, upon principles of law, and moral justice, to apply the maxim '*falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*'" (Italics ours.)

The appellant has cited the case of *Gan Sec* 83 Fed. Supp. 482, in support of his argument that the immigration records should not have been admitted into evidence. Although the above case held that under 8 U.S.C. 903 to be a trial *de novo*, the court did consider the immigration records as independent evidence. page 486:

"There was put in evidence the various transcripts of the proceedings had before the consular and mental officers and agencies."

Thus the Court considered the records submitted by the government, along with the testimony given at trial, and then found that the plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of proof. The Court's attitude is also invited to footnote 3 on page 485 in the cited case:

"There has just come to hand the opinion of the Supreme Court in *George Holtzoff of the District of Columbia v. Mah Ying Og v. Clark et al.*, D.C. 81 Fed. Supp. 696, 697, where the Court held and pronounced that Sec. 503 'contemplates a trial de

e noted that the Court did not find, in the case *Ying Og v. Clark*, supra, that the records of administrative hearing were inadmissible. The Judge Holtzoff stated at page 697:

the 1940 statute, however, contemplates a *re-opening* and a full judicial hearing of the entire of citizenship without confining it *merely* to review of the administrative action." (Italics lied.)

language used by the Honorable Judge Holtzoff that in his opinion an action under 8 U.S.C. incorporates not only new evidence taken at the trial, but also the *reopening* and *review* entire administrative procedure. The Court men, as was stated by the Honorable Judge in the case at bar, arrive at its own con- after taking into consideration all the evidence.

gh the specific question as to the admissibility migration records into evidence under the s of 8 U.S.C. 903 has not been previously de- ner authorities indicate the record of an ad- ive hearing should be admitted into evidence. kman's Compensation Act provides by statute ring *de novo*. In the case of *Worn v. Ana- opper Mine Co.*, 43 P. (2d) 663, 667, the Court of Montana interpreted that statute ng *Dosen v. East Butte Copper Mine Co.*, 60 as follows:

e term 'de novo' as used in the statute, is

emphasize the fact that after all the statute meant, *that all the evidence taken by the court and all of the additional evidence taken by the Ct. should be considered together and that that evidence as a whole, the Ct. should render judgment.*" (Italics ours.)

The United States Code provides ample authority for the introduction into evidence of the immaterial records objected to by appellant's counsel. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1732 reads as follows:

**"RECORD MADE IN REGULAR COURSE
OF BUSINESS.**

In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of the transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in the regular course of any business, and if it appears from the regular course of such business to be a memorandum or record at the time of such transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.

All other circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.

The term 'business', as used in this section, includes business, profession, occupations,

Courts, in considering the above section, in the functions of government agencies within the definition of the term "business".

Lein v. United States, 8 Cir. 1949, 176 F. (2d) 184. Cert. den. 1949, 338 U.S. 870, 70 S. Ct. 145 (voting lists);

United States v. Ward, 2 Cir. 1949, 173 F. (2d) 628 (Selective Service record);

Forwood v. Great American Indemnity Co., 3 Cir. 1944, 146 F. (2d) 797 (Navy service record);

Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 3 Cir. 1943, 138 F. (2d) 123 (birth certificate);

Munter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 2 Cir. 1940, 110 F. (2d) 970, 133 A.L.R. 255 (coroner's death certificate).

Court, in the case of *Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.*, 86 F. Supp. 255, on pages 279-280, follows:

) The purpose of the exception of the hearsay rule, as I read the authorities, where reference is made to reports formulated by an agency of the government by virtue of a congressional authority is to make possible the presentment of facts or circumstances which appear in that report where it is necessary to rely on what is contained in the report in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

* * * * *

Public records compiled in the regular

tion on the grounds that the inquisition was in the nature of a judicial proceeding wherein the right of cross examination was amply safeguarded and protected. * * *

The United States Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit when considering the above case, stated as follows on page 473 of 183 F. (2d) 467:

“The report is no less admissible because it contains conclusions of experts which are based upon hearsay evidence as well as upon observation. These circumstances, by virtue of the express statutory provision, go to weight rather than to admissibility.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in the case of *Klein v. United States*, cited supra, on pages 187-188, as follows in reference to voting records:

“Being public records made contemporaneously with the event which they reflect, they are presumptively correct and are ‘writing of fact’ * * * made as a memorandum or record within the meaning of Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1732 (now 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1732); *Hoffman v. United States*, 8 Cir., 143 F. (2d) 795; *Hoffman v. United States*, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S. Ct. 477, 80 L. Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719. The argument of course goes to the effect or weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.”

Section 1733 of Title 28 U.S.C.A. is also applicable and reads as follows:

e. 1733. GOVERNMENT RECORDS AND PAPERS; COPIES.

) Books or records of account or minutes of department or agency of the United States shall be admissible to prove the act, transaction or occurrence as a memorandum of which the same were made or kept.

) Properly authenticated copies or transcripts of any books, records, papers or documents of any department or agency of the United States shall be admitted in evidence equally with the originals thereof. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.

Applying the above statute to the case at bar, the records of the Immigration Service are admissible to the Board of Special Inquiry was held. In the transcript of the proceedings are presumed to be correct. As to this latter point, counsel for the appellant has not challenged the correctness or authenticity of the documents offered in evi-

The appellant has cited as authority *United States v. ...*, 63 F. Supp. 811, and as quoted by the court on page 14 of his brief, the Court stated:

However, not every oral or written extra-judicial statement offered in evidence comes within the hearsay rule. It is only where the extra-judicial statement is offered to establish the truth of the fact so stated that the hearsay rule can be applied. *Where the extra judicial statement is of-*

*that the oral statement, in fact, was made
written statement, in fact, exists, then the
is without the hearsay rule."* (Italics our

The immigration records were not introduced to prove the truth of the words spoken. In the record is so interwoven with discrepancies that it becomes obvious many of the statements cannot be reconciled. It therefore follows that the transcript was offered in evidence not to prove the truth of the word spoken, but to establish that oral statements were made.

The portion of the administrative record to which the appellant specifically objected was the testimony of his alleged uncle, Wong Gong. During the course of the administrative hearing, the appellant permitted Wong Gong as a witness in his own behalf. The hearing conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry is semi-judicial in nature. The parties in interest before the Board of Special Inquiry were the same as before the Court below. The appellant was represented by the same counsel who now brings this appeal. There was opportunity for cross-examination of the witness. As a practical matter, the appellant had the records of the Board of Special Inquiry produced at the trial. Counsel for the appellant urged to the Court's considering Wong Gong's testimony given at the Board hearing. The following questions and answers appear on page 63 in the transcript record:

the other proceeding. He is introducing his testimony. I believe in order to have his testimony before the Court he should produce the witness before the Court. Why don't you produce him?

Mr. Chow. In the first place, I have asked the witness whether he is available and he is working in the city, and——

The Court. You have the process of the court available to you.

Mr. Chow. I don't want to subject him to loss of wages, your Honor.

The Court. All right."

From the above testimony, it appears that the only objection advanced by the appellant for the non-production of Wong Gong, was that it might subject him to loss of wages.

The appellant alleges that the defendant below had no objection of presenting Wong Gong as a witness. Such an objection is not consistent with the facts. The appellant alleges that he is the nephew of Wong Gong, and that he has no allegations that he could not have produced Wong Gong at the time of the trial. In fact, from the statement of Mr. Chow, supra, it appears that Wong Gong was available as a witness. Under such circumstances, a strong presumption arises that had Wong Gong been called as a witness, his testimony would have been adverse to the appellant.

The honorable Judge Murphy, relative to the objection of Wong Gong as a witness, stated in his

“* * * Testimony of the alleged uncle in that he was the only witness presented by plaintiff who could establish a link of connection between the adult now seeking admission and the six year old boy that Wong Yem purports to have left in China. His refusal to identify Wong Yem and his denial of plaintiff's testimony given great weight by the Immigration Commission. Plaintiff knew this. He could not have seen the shadow it threw over his claim. Significantly, he made no effort to bring Wong Gong before this tribunal. He charged in his brief that Wong Gong lied—yet he was not to put the lie to him before this court. An omission hardly accords with plaintiff's protestations of forthrightness.”

Should one party fail to produce an essential witness, where he has the power to do so, a strong presumption arises that if the witness was produced his testimony would be against him. In the case of *Mammoth Oil Company v. United States*, 211 U.S. 913, affirmed 111 F. (2d) 455, the Court stated: “and applying the familiar rule that where it is material testimony to establish a fact, and in the present ability of the litigant to produce it (he) fails to do so, or offers a reasonable explanation for such failure, *the presumption follows that if the testimony, if presented, would be against such party.*” *Mammoth Oil Company v. United States*, 211 U.S. 913, 48 S. Ct. 1, 72 L. Ed. 137.” (Italics added.)

The United States Supreme Court in *M*

Familiar rules govern the consideration of evidence. As said by Lord Mansfield in *Blatch v. Archer* (Cowper 63-65): 'It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the weight of proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have contradicted.' " (page 51.)

Page 52, quoted *Commonwealth v. Webster*, 5 Mass. 316:

But when pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious circumstances can be accounted for consistently with his innocence, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, and of rebutting would tend to sustain the charge."

Defendant is not in a position to complain that evidence, Wong Gong, was not produced, when it was in his power to do so.

Chicago M. St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Slowik, 184 U.S. 199, 22 F. (2d) 920.

The Court's attention is invited to the untenable position which the government would be placed, should it be allowed to introduce into evidence the records of its administrative hearings. The Court may be given special notice that there are few, if any, public

Government has evolved a system of records of the genealogy of Chinese claimants to United States nationality. These records constitute the best evidence available, and are in most instances the only primary evidence, to assist the Courts or the administrative agency, in determining the veracity of claims to United States nationality, made by persons of Mongolian race.

In practice, the records of the family history are superior to the testimony of the parties in such cases, and in effect constitute the best evidence. It may be seen that the appellee when defending a writ of habeas corpus, in a writ of habeas corpus type of action, has nothing on which to rely but the record and transcript of the administrative proceedings.

II.

IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON APPELLANT TO ESTABLISH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE HIS CLAIM TO UNITED STATES NATIONALITY.

The appellant's first point asserts that the Court below erred in holding that appellant had failed to sustain the burden of establishing his relationship to his father, Wong Yem, by a preponderance of evidence. The appellant contends that if the immigration records were not admissible in evidence, then appellant made out a *prima facie* claim to United States nationality.

appellee asserts that the immigration records
admissible in evidence, and therefore the Court
properly found that appellant had failed to
meet the burden of establishing his relationship to
the United States. The appellee further contends that a
prima facie showing is insufficient to estab-
lish United States nationality.

A person arriving at a port in the United States
has the right to enter as a citizen and national must
bear the burden of proof in establishing his na-
tionality. The burden rests on a Chinese applicant for
admission to the United States to prove that he is the
naturalized American citizen.

Yinn ex rel. Yee Suey v. Ward, 104 F. (2d)
900;

Wun Kock Quon v. Proctor, 92 F. (2d) 326;

Wing Yen Loy v. Cahill, 81 F. (2d) 809;

Wong Choy v. Haff, 83 F. (2d) 983;

Wun Ying Loon v. Carr, 108 F. (2d) 91.

There is a natural presumption that a person of the
Mongolian race is an alien and not a citizen of the United
States. In the case of *Ex parte Lung Wing Wun*, 161
F. (2d) 212, 213 (habeas corpus action involving the
return of a Chinese person to the United States
after a visit to China—hearing on the merits), the
Court stated:

There is a natural presumption that a person
of the Mongolian race coming to this country from
China, is an alien, and to overcome that presump-

convincing evidence is essential, because a proceeding or inquiry having for its object the lawful determination of questions affecting the claim to citizenship asserted by such a person, he is himself an exhibit, his language, his conduct, and physical appearance must be considered as evidence tending to prove his alienage, and without evidence sufficient to create a belief that a person is, notwithstanding his alien parentage, a citizen by birth, the natural presumption is that he is an alien, and that presumption is not to be thrown into a legal conclusion." (Italics ours.)

In the case of *Lee Sim v. United States*, 219 F.2d 435, the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, stated:

"In these deportation proceedings the natural presumption that a person of the Mongolian race is an alien and it is essential to overcome it and to show that he is entitled to the privileges of citizenship in the United States should be clear and convincing." (Italics ours.)

In the case of *Ex parte Chin Him, et al.*, 220 F.2d 133, the District Court of New York (1915) stated:

"and finally, as was held in *Lee Sim v. United States*, supra, there is in a proceeding to determine the status of a person of the Mongolian race, a natural presumption that he is an alien, which can only be thrown by clear and convincing evidence." (Italics ours.)

As stated supra in *Siu Say v. Nagle*, et al.

is to the mere fact of relationship cannot be accepted or relied upon. This principle is also held by Justice Field of the Supreme Court of the United States, when writing the opinion of the Court in the case of *Quock Ting v. United States*, 140

The authorities cited, supra, it is well established that a person applying for admission into the United States as a foreign born citizen must establish citizenship by *clear and convincing evidence*. This requires more than a mere *prima facie* showing that the person is a citizen of the United States.

Decisions were issued pursuant to the statute under which the present action was filed. Sec. 112.2 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 deals with persons arriving in the United States for the purpose of prosecuting, before the courts, their claim to United States nationality. Therein follows the presumption that all such persons applying for admission to the United States are to be aliens and not citizens of this country.

CONCLUSION.

Petitioner respectfully submits that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503 of the Nationality Act of 1940), contra a trial *de novo* in which the Court, sitting in equity, should consider all the evidence, including both a review of the administrative pro-

trial. The Court should then arrive at its conclusion based on all the evidence before the

It is well known that fraud abounds in real cases. The finding by an Administrative Board that the claimed relationship does not exist raises inference of fraud. To exclude the testimony at the Administrative Hearing would place the judge in a very precarious position. He is forced to make a decision with only a portion of the evidence before him. Such a procedure could be in the lower Court declaring alien impostors to be citizens of the United States.

United States nationality is a prized possession and it is impossible to compute its value in monetary terms. Men have for years committed all manner of crimes in an effort to be recognized as citizens of the United States. The Courts in the years past have taken cognizance of the many and varied attempts to establish, through fraud, false claims to United States nationality. As a natural result, a person of foreign birth, arriving for the first time in the United States has been required by the Courts to prove by *clear and convincing evidence* that he is, in fact, a citizen of this country. Such a requirement is proper when we consider that the United States is a sovereign nation with the inherent power and obligation to protect its people and property from aliens of other lands. It is submitted that the judge in the Court below erred in stating the law when requiring the appellant to

a preponderance of evidence, that he is a
the United States.

therefore, respectfully requested that the
for the defendant awarded by the Court
affirmed.

San Francisco, California,
October 10, 1951.

CHAUNCEY TRAMUTOLO,
United States Attorney,

EDGAR R. BONSALL,

Assistant United States Attorney,

Attorneys for Appellee.

ARGREAVES,

WINE,

the Brief.

